Last Updated on October 20, 2024 by Karl Thompson
The deaths of 54 adults and 18 children in the Grenfell Tower fire were avoidable, according to the recent Grenfell report.
Those who died were failed over many years and in numerous ways by those responsible for the safety of the building.
The fire started in one flat due to a malfunctioning fridge-freezer. The first fire engine arrived by 00:59, and the initial kitchen fire was extinguished by 1:21. However, by that time, the fire had spread outside through the kitchen window and rapidly engulfed the building, reaching the roof by 1:27. By 4:00, all four sides of the building were ablaze.
The Grenfell Tower Fire: who was responsible…?
The main reason for the fire’s rapid spread was the combustible aluminium composite material used in the cladding during renovations in 2015–16: Reynobond 55 PE, manufactured by Arconic. It consists of two thin sheets of aluminium with a flammable polyethylene core, which burns intensely.
Between the cladding and the concrete wall was a further layer of combustible insulation, which released toxic gas as it burned.
Because the fire spread on the outside of the building, the compartmentalisation designed to prevent the internal spread of fire failed.
The architects, Studio E, initially intended to use non-combustible zinc panels but instead chose the cheaper, combustible materials under pressure from the Tenant Management Organisation, part of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. This decision saved almost £300,000 on a £9.2 million refurbishment.
There was systematic dishonesty from those who sold the cladding—Arconic, Celotex, and Kingspan—all of whom deliberately manipulated testing processes and misled the market about the safety of their products.
The regulators failed as well. The cladding materials were certified by the BBA, a privatised certification body. It was their responsibility to scrutinise the testing procedures more closely.
The central government also failed. Fires involving ACM cladding had occurred in smaller buildings as far back as 1991.
David Cameron’s government, with its neoliberal deregulatory agenda, left safety regulations under-resourced. One junior civil servant was given responsibility for fire safety measures with little oversight.
The architects, Studio E, and the contractors who installed the cladding also bear some responsibility.
Finally, the fire brigade was found to have serious and systematic failings. The control room was overwhelmed, radios failed, the “stay put” order was incorrect, and there was no clear strategy for this particular scenario.
Relevance to A-Level Sociology
This case study highlights the continued relevance of the Marxist perspective on crime, which argues that we should focus on social harms rather than only on criminal acts. In the case of Grenfell, significant harm was done, but not everyone responsible will be held accountable because many of those involved did not technically commit criminal acts.
It also shows that victims of such incidents are more likely to be poor. Fire safety standards were not followed properly due to budget constraints. Grenfell was social housing, and the residents were poorer individuals living in London. The local authority aimed to save money during the renovation, which is why they opted for cheaper, unsafe cladding materials.
This is a strong example of the failures of neoliberal economic policies, especially in showing how deregulation can lead to devastating consequences.
NB: There may still be criminal prosecutions in the future, but it is likely that many people complicit in these failures will escape punishment.